The 'direct participation' exception to the principle of distinction, found in Article 51(3) of Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Protocol II, embodies a long-recognized concept in the laws governing armed conflict. For centuries the broad notion that humanity demands the protection only of those citizens who are harmless has found expression in the rules and norms relating to war. This article traces the historical factors and trends which influenced the development of the 'direct participation' exception in its current form, revealing a tendency towards 'humanizing' the law in favour of civilians, notwithstanding their increased military value.
Although Article 51(3) is novel in its codification and phrasing of the 'direct participation' exception, the basic idea underpinning it -that humanity demands the protection of citizens, provided they are harmless -is not. The general concept that non-combatants who engage in hostile acts may be exposed to attack (and punishment) dates back several centuries. Against this historical backdrop, this paper will trace the factors and 'mischiefs' which influenced the formulation of Article 51(3) and which continue to affect its application.
Recognizing that Article 51(3) closes the conceptual gap between civilians entitled to protection from attack and combatants permitted to participate directly in hostilities, this inquiry commences by considering the development of these interlinked categories of persons. Starting with Grotius in the seventeenth century and proceeding to Rousseau in the eighteenth, it traces the limited right to participate in hostilities and the immunity of non-combatants. This paper illustrates that the development of the two categories has been heavily informed by the paradigms of war in which they have arisen, and also by notions of guilt and innocence, military necessity, chivalry and humanity. Having established these foundations, the second part of the paper considers the challenges posed by civilians participating in hostilities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the international legal responses to such participation. While it is beyond the capacity of this paper to critique these activities or the responses to them in any detail, the hidden factors behind the laws, and how they fit within the dominant paradigm of conflict, are examined. The third part of this paper examines the legislative path to the introduction of Article 51(3) and the increased legal protection it provides for civilians. Such an examination is relevant not only for the current interpretation of the article, 13 but also for an understanding of the factors underpinning it. Finally, drawing on these factors, this paper analyses some trends in the development of Article 51(3) and the compatibility of these trends with changes in the nature of contemporary armed conflict, particularly the shifting demands of military necessity.
The paper does not consider the specific challenges raised by modern warfare in depth; this has been done elsewhere.
14 Rather, in recognition of the changing methods of warfare adopted over the last three decades, it considers the relevance of some of the major assumptions and biases which underpin Protocol I. In so doing, this paper provides a useful backdrop against which to view current debates about the circumstances in which civilians should forfeit their immunity as non-combatants for taking a direct part in hostilities under Article 51(3). 13 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, opened for signature 23 May 1969 (entered into force 27 January 1980), Article 32, which allows recourse to be had to a treaty's preparatory works if the meaning of the text is ambiguous or obscure. The ongoing discussions about the meaning of Article 51(3) suggest that this is the case. 14 See, e.g., Quéguiner, above note 7; Schmitt, above note 9; N. Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.
Background: Grotius to Rousseau
This paper's inquiry into the development of the 'direct participation' exception to civilian immunity begins with Grotius, since his work, along with that of Francisco de Vitoria, is acknowledged as the analytical basis of the contemporary law of land warfare. 15 Grotius, writing in the midst of the Thirty Years War in 1625, recorded the state of the law of nations -the nascent international law -as he perceived it. By the seventeenth century, modern nation-states, although in an incipient form, had emerged as the only legitimate authorities in Europe that could make war on their neighbours and suppress rebellion within their own realms. 16 Their status as such was cemented with the adoption, in 1648, of the Peace of Westphalia, which abolished private armies and conferred a legal monopoly on states for the maintenance of armies and for fighting wars. 17 Developing on the 'just war' theories, ideas of military honour and chivalry required that wars be fought 'publicly and openly ' . 18 Those who fought in wars without the authority of the state were considered marauders, brigands and freebooters outside the law of nations, 19 and perfidy was repugnant to the fighting classes. 20 In accordance with the ideas of the medieval law of war (the jus militare), those who engaged in other than 'open and public wars' met short shrift at the hands of the fighting classes. 21 It is against this background that the writings of Grotius are considered.
Grotius, the practice of nations and restraint in war
Grotius' starting point was his conception of the effect of a declaration of war on a sovereign's subjects. In his view, a public war (that is, a war waged between two or more sovereign authorities) was 'declared at the same time … upon all a sovereign's subjects '. 22 Accordingly, the 'right to kill' which arises in war 23 extended 'not only to those who actually bear arms, or are subjects of him that stirs up the war, but in addition to all persons who are in the enemy's territory'. 24 Grotius explicitly stated that the slaughter of infants, women, old men, hostages and 'suppliants' seeking to surrender was permissible in a public war. 25 He found ample evidence of the slaughter of non-combatants in the writings of ancient scholars and the 'common practice of nations'.
26
Grotius explicitly distinguished, however, between actions which are 'permissible' according to the law of nations (such as those outlined above) and those which were 'right', 'praiseworthy' or 'honourable'. 27 He wrote, when I first set out to explain this part of the law of nations I bore witness that many things are said to be 'lawful' or 'permissible' for the reason that they are done with impunity, in part also because coactive tribunals lend to them their authority; things which, nevertheless, either deviate from the rule of right (whether this has its basis in law strictly so called, or in the admonitions of other virtues), or at any rate may be omitted on higher grounds and with greater praise among good men.
28
His treatment of legally permissible actions may thus be seen as a forced concession to past verdict and practice.
29
On the question of what is 'right' or 'honourable' in war (or the lex ferenda), Grotius stated as a basic principle, 'One must take care, so far as is possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even by accident.' 30 While he did not expressly define 'innocent persons', he appears to have been referring to those who are unarmed 31 and have not committed any serious crimes. 32 Citing Livy and Josephus, Grotius observed, By the law of war armed men and those who offer resistance are killed. … [I]t is right that in war those who have taken up arms should pay the penalty, but that the guiltless should not be injured.
33
In Grotius' view, children should always be spared, as should women, unless they 'have committed a crime which ought to be punished in a special manner, or unless they take the place of men'. 34 Similarly, men 'whose manner of life is opposed to war' -specifically those who perform religious duties or men of letters -should be spared. 35 In urging restraint in relation to these categories of civilians, unless they took up arms, Grotius trod a path well worn by earlier commentators such as Gentili, Suarez and Vitoria. 36 It was, however, Grotius' reluctant view that the lex lata 37 permitted the slaughter of these categories of civilians as they were, according to Grotius' conception, 'enemies' in a public war.
Rousseau's maxim
From Grotius' concept of the effect of a declaration of war, the significance of Rousseau's commentary becomes apparent. In contrast with Grotius, Rousseau took the view that war is a relation between governments, involving the citizens of a state only 'accidentally'. Writing in 1762, Rousseau said, War, then, is not a relationship between man and man, but between State and State, in which private persons are only enemies accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but simply as soldiers; not as members of their fatherland, but as its defenders … 38 Rousseau's maxim explicitly recognized that non-combatant citizens are not, in any real sense, the enemies of an opposing army and should not be made its object. 39 Prior to Rousseau's contribution, the separate identity of the individual and his or her state was not recognized by the law of nations; the identification of one with the other was total. 40 Rousseau's maxim is, accordingly, seen by many as forming the modern jurisprudential basis for the principle of non-combatant immunity, 41 or as Best wryly put it, 'the non-combatant's supreme talisman'. 42 deal of involvement of the civilian population. 44 In contrast with the bloodiness of the Thirty Years War, during which Grotius wrote his treatise, wars in Rousseau's era were fought by professional armies, the expense of which kept conflicts small. 45 Moreover, military professionalism ensured that a soldier's focus was on mastering armed opponents, not on the civilian population. 46 Publicists such as Vattel were already cautiously moving towards a judicial statement of non-combatant immunity to match the practical immunity increasingly being achieved in conflict. 47 Rousseau's statement, however, was appealing for its 'surpassing simplicity'. 48 It set up an unbridgeable conceptual divide between combatants and non-combatants. 49 Over the years, many people have criticized aspects of Rousseau's maxim. 50 It is outside the scope of this paper to examine the merits of these criticisms in detail. Suffice it to note that, although the maxim was, and is, far from universally accepted, 51 its influence is undeniable. 52 The conceptual gulf it established, coupled with the idea (alluded to by Rousseau and codified in 1868 in the St Petersburg Declaration)
53 that the only legitimate object of war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy, brought Grotius' conception of the lex ferenda to life. In this way, the concept of innocence, on which Grotius and his contemporaries had focused, expanded and metamorphosed into notions of civilian status and the protection of civilians from attack. 54 Against the above backdrop, the second part of this paper considers some of the different ways in which non-combatants have participated in hostilities throughout history, and how the laws of war responded to them.
Law-making and the 'wars of nations'
Beginning with the revolutionary wars of the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, war passed through a transition from the dynastic war of kings to the war of nations-at-arms, in which entire populations were mobilized to support the war effort. 55 An increasing range of activities involving peasants, such as providing food to partisans and passing on information about the occupying army, came to be regarded as political participation in conflict. 56 Armed resistance increased alongside political participation, and took many forms, including spontaneous armed resistance, organized acts of resistance in the form of guerrillas and francs-tireurs, 57 and the levée en masse. 58 Any currency Rousseau's maxim once held was undermined.
During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the practical response to non-uniformed fighters was usually ferocious. 59 Due to the 'treacherous' threat they posed, armed civilians, regardless of gender, were attacked with 'a draconian severity' by opposing armed forces. 60 Moreover, according to Nabulsi, there was no real legal or practical distinction between non-violent political behaviour and violent resistance. 61 Peasants who, for instance, passed on information about the occupying army, hid escaped prisoners of war or fed illicit fighters, were deemed as criminal as those who physically killed soldiers from the occupying force.
62 They were also exposed to risks, including being shot, for certain conduct, such as hiding their own crops. 63 Due to the relative paucity of historical records on political resistance in the nineteenth century, 64 it is difficult to determine whether political resisters were targeted directly or executed as a matter of law enforcement. From 55 See, e.g., the French 'Levée en masse' decree from 1793: 'Young men shall go to battle; married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; women shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in the hospitals; children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to public places in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic', reproduced the few records that do exist, however, it appears that, primarily, they were executed as a matter of law enforcement. 65 How the positive laws of war would deal with the various forms of civilian conduct was yet to be determined. The growing involvement of civilians in political life, including in armed conflict, compelled governments in the nineteenth century to discuss the question of 'normalizing' their involvement in war. 66 As discussed below, European countries which relied more heavily on the civilian population in armed conflict advocated their recognition as legitimate combatants. The debates around this issue were heavily influenced by the work of Dr Francis Lieber, a German émigré to America.
Lieber and his Code
It was not only in Europe that the participation of non-combatants in war demanded attention. Across the Atlantic, the methods used by the South in the American Civil War compelled the Union government to find ways of addressing the legal status of guerrilla warfare. 67 According to Hartigan, in the early years of the conflict the Union army tended to equate all irregular troops with 'guerrillas', who in turn were classified as criminals. 68 As in Europe during the revolutionary wars, this generalization applied not only to those who bore arms for the South, but also to non-combatant civilians who either actively or passively supported irregular troops. 69 The rebel authorities, on the other hand, claimed the right to engage in guerrilla warfare and be treated as combatants.
70
Writers on the laws of war had not dealt with the status of these troops in any comprehensive manner. 71 In apparent recognition of the conundrum, Henry Wager Halleck, the general-in-chief of the Union armies, wrote to Lieber in 1862 requesting his assistance in defining guerrilla warfare. 72 Lieber obliged, initially producing an essay on the topic 73 and later completing a more comprehensive field manual. Due to Lieber's substantial influence on the subsequent codification of the laws of war, it is worthwhile examining his contribution in some detail.
65 But see Best, above note 38, p. 199 (discussing instances of German armed forces in 1870 shooting not only at civilians who shot at them, but also those 'who were not so clearly doing so'). Lieber's essay on guerrilla warfare and the laws of war dealt comprehensively with the treatment of 'armed parties loosely attached to the main body of the army, or altogether unconnected with it'. 74 Lieber observed that while several categories of armed bands (the freebooter, marauder, brigand, partisan, free corps, spy, war-rebel or conspirator, highway robber and levée en masse or 'arming of the peasants') were dealt with by the laws of war, 'guerrilla parties' 75 were not. 76 Guerrillas, according to Lieber, are 'peculiarly dangerous, because they easily evade pursuit, and by laying down their arms become insidious enemies; because they cannot otherwise subsist than by rapine, and almost always degenerate into simple robbers or brigands'. 77 In reflection of this 'peculiar' threat, Lieber argued that, when guerrilla parties aid the main army of the belligerent in 'fair fight and open warfare', they should be treated as regular partisans. 78 If, however, they resort to 'occasional fighting and the occasional assuming of peaceful habits, and to brigandage', they should not be protected by the laws of war.
79
Lieber's treatment of 'guerrilla parties' may be contrasted with his treatment of the levée en masse. After noting that most constitutions enshrined the right of the people to possess and use arms, Lieber concluded that it was generally agreed that the rising of the people openly to repel invasion entitled them to the privileges of the laws of war. 80 The absence of a uniform was immaterial, provided such absence was not used for the purpose of concealment or disguise. 81 Lieber thus gave emphasis to the idea of 'openness', a dominant indicator of a lawful war in medieval and post-Westphalian warfare.
82
Lieber subsequently completed his manual on the laws of war, which became 'General Orders, no. 100: Instructions for the Armies of the United States in the Field'. 83 Lieber, whose political affiliations were with the anti-slavery North, felt that in order to preserve the Union and free the slaves, it was essential to bring discipline to the Union army and to define precisely the status of the enemy troops and greater population. 84 In the light of this attitude, it is, perhaps, unsurprising that his Code constituted 'an admixture of military sternness with basic 74 Lieber, above note 71, p. 31. 75 By 'guerrilla parties' Lieber meant self-constituted sets of armed men in times of war, who form no integrant part of the organized army, do not stand on the regular pay-roll of the army, or are not paid at all, take up arms and lay them down at intervals, and carry on petty war (guerrilla) chiefly by raids, extortion, destruction, and massacre, and who cannot encumber themselves with many prisoners, and will therefore generally give no quarter. (ibid., p. 41). Article 22 of the Code provided for the immunity of civilians. It stated, 'The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honour as much as the exigencies of war will admit.' 89 The question of precisely how much 'the exigencies of war will admit' was not further developed in the Lieber Code. It was clear from Article 15 that all armed enemy citizens may be directly attacked. 90 However, the Code was less direct on the protection from attack provided to hostile, but unarmed, civilians.
91 Some, such as spies and certain types of war traitors, 92 were to be dealt with under severe rules of law enforcement, which included capture and execution. 93 Moreover, those who 'held intercourse' with the enemy were also treated as war traitors and faced 'severe' punishment. 94 
Brussels to The Hague
Lieber's authority as to the laws of war was held by his contemporaries in high regard, 96 and his Code was widely adopted in Europe. 97 The Lieber Code formed the basis of the draft text for the Brussels Conference in 1874, which was convened at the behest of Emperor Alexander of Russia. 98 The Conference gave rise to a Protocol and a Declaration on the laws of war. 99 The Declaration was not ratified due to the unwillingness of the 'great powers', who, according to Jochnick and Normand, considered it too 'humanitarian'. 100 Many of its rules were, nonetheless, reproduced in military manuals.
101
The Brussels Protocol adopted, in slightly looser terms, the principle of restraint laid down six years earlier in the St Petersburg Declaration, 102 stating that the only legitimate object of war is to weaken the enemy without inflicting unnecessary suffering. 103 The Brussels Declaration went on to specify, in Articles 9 to 11, the classes of people who should be recognized as 'belligerents' under the laws of war. Under Article 9, the laws of war applied to armies, and militia and volunteer corps who were commanded by a responsible person, had a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance, carried arms openly, and conducted their operations in accordance with the laws of war. Like the Lieber Code, this definition of 'belligerent' focused on the requirement of 'openness' of warfare and reflected an aversion for perfidious methods. According to Risley, writing at the close of the nineteenth century, Article 9 accurately expressed the generally accepted laws of war.
104 Article 10 conferred belligerent status on the members of a levée en masse, while Article 11 granted prisoner of war status to non-combatant members of the armed forces.
On the controversial issue of those outside the armed forces or the levée en masse who resisted invasion or occupation, the Brussels Declaration said nothing. This omission was not for want of trying. The Russian draft text, for instance, proposed that individuals not qualifying as combatants, but who 'at one time take part independently in the operations of war, and at another return to their pacific occupations …, do not enjoy the rights of belligerents, and are amenable, in case of capture, to military justice'. 105 The draft article was, however, withdrawn as a consequence of the opposition of the smaller powers, many of whom viewed the Brussels Conference as an attempt by the military powers to prevent resistance being offered by the civilian population against an invader. 106 The Brussels Declaration did not, therefore, explicitly forbid guerrilla warfare and other forms of civilian participation in hostilities falling outside Article 9. 107 Rather, it merely enumerated conditions (in Articles 9 and 10) under which combatants were to be regarded as lawful. 108 Thus, in the absence of rules protecting civilians, individuals who participated in hostilities in any way continued to do so at their own risk. 109 The Brussels Declaration, while not ratified, provided an important basis for the work of the jurists of the Institute of International Law, who produced the 'Oxford Manual' in 1880. 110 The Oxford Manual, which purported to codify 'the accepted ideas of our age so far as this has appeared allowable and practicable', 111 provided in Article 1, The state of war does not admit of acts of violence, save between the armed forces of belligerent States. Persons not forming part of a belligerent armed force should abstain from such acts. 112 The armed forces of a state were defined in Article 2 and included bodies other than the regular army which, among other things, wore a uniform or 'fixed distinctive emblem' and carried arms openly. 113 The manual went on to forbid the 'maltreatment' of 'inoffensive populations', on the basis that 'The contest (is) carried on by "armed forces" only.' 114 Like the Brussels Declaration, however, the Manual did not give further consideration to the question of people who fell in the gap between the 'armed force' and 'inoffensive population', such as civilians who engaged in hostile acts, whether bearing arms or not. The exception to this rule was the treatment of individuals as spies, who could not demand treatment as prisoners of war.
115
Although the Manual was ignored by most countries and derided by its contemporaries, 116 it formed, along with the Brussels Declaration, the basis of the Hague Conventions on the conduct of land warfare which were adopted in 1899 and 1907.
117 These Conventions were, according to their preambles, 'inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit'.
118 Both Conventions adopted a set of Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land which were in most material respects identical. As Best has observed, the Hague Regulations have provided the basis for the laws of land warfare ever since.
119
In contrast with the Oxford Manual and, to a lesser extent, the Brussels Protocol, 120 the Hague Conventions did not refer specifically to the immunity of civilians from direct attack. 121 The definition of 'belligerent' used in the Brussels Declaration was, however, reproduced in the Hague Regulations without change.
122 Participants in the levée en masse who carried arms openly and respected the laws of war were likewise considered belligerents entitled to the rights and subject to the duties of the laws of war. 123 The continued focus on openness was also apparent in the definition of spies. A spy was a person who, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, attempted to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. 124 Soldiers not wearing a disguise who managed to penetrate the zone of operations of the hostile army to obtain information were not considered spies. Nor were civilians who 'openly' carried out their mission to deliver despatches. 125 The Regulations did not expressly address the fate of other civilians who, falling short of the definition of belligerent, took up arms against an invading or [N]o use of force against an enemy is lawful, unless it is necessary to accomplish the purposes of war. The custom of civilized nations, founded upon this principle, has therefore exempted … all … public or private individuals engaged in the ordinary civil pursuits of life, from the direct effect of military operations, unless actually taken in arms, or guilty of some misconduct in violation of the usages of war, by which they forfeit their immunity. 127 The editor's accompanying note elaborated that non-combatants who 'make forcible resistance, or violate the mild rules of modern warfare, give military information to their friends, or obstruct the forces in possession … are liable to be treated as combatants'. 128 Thus, hostile but unarmed civilians could lawfully be targeted for their participation in conflict.
Risley, writing in the closing years of the nineteenth century, appears, at first blush, to have interpreted the law more restrictively in favour of civilians. In language reminiscent of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, 129 he argued that subjects of a belligerent 'are not liable to be killed or taken as prisoners of war so long as they do not actively engage in hostilities'. 130 Further examination of Risley's argument, however, suggests that participation in hostilities need not in fact have been 'active' for a non-combatant to lose immunity. Risley contended that the immunity of non-combatants was granted on the implicit understanding that the distinction between the classes of combatant and non-combatant be maintained in good faith. 131 Accordingly, immunity was 'forfeited by a non-combatant who commits any hostile act'. 132 He stated,
Combatants must be open enemies, known and knowable, and non-combatants must be harmless. As soon as an individual ceases to be harmless, he ceases to be a non-combatant, and must be reckoned a combatant; and unless he bears the distinguishing marks of an open combatant, he puts himself outside the laws of war, and is, if captured, liable to be shot as a bandit instead of detained as a prisoner of war.
133
In accordance with Risley's analysis, civilians who 'actively engaged in hostilities', 'ceased to be harmless', or '[committed] any hostile acts' would have become subject to attack. The breadth of, and lack of precision in, these phrases would have provided cold comfort to civilians in conflict zones at the turn of the twentieth century. Regrettably, significant gaps in the positive law, such as the lack of a definition of 'civilian' and the failure of the world's powers to agree on the status of individuals who took up arms or otherwise participated in hostilities without meeting the requirements of belligerent status, 134 persisted for some time. These deficiencies opened the door for arguments in the early part of the twentieth century that all non-combatants whose destruction would be of military value should lose their immunity from attack.
The challenges of 'total war'
The twentieth century saw a blurring of the distinction between combatants and civilians in armed conflict. 135 With no positive law protecting (or, indeed, defining) civilians, their immunity from attack was precarious 136 and vulnerable to arguments that military necessity permitted them to be targeted. Wright observed in his authoritative A Study of War in 1942, As the proportion of the population contributing directly or indirectly to the making of the policy and the military of the enemy have increased, economic and propaganda measures have gained in relative importance. Attacks upon civilians … have increased under the plea that traditional rules must be applied in the light of 'military necessity' as developed under changing technical conditions.
137
As discussed below, by the Second World War arguments of military necessity were used to justify widespread bombing of civilian and industrial targets. The notion that humanity required the protection of 'harmless' civilians, which had come to be the norm at the turn of the twentieth century, 138 proved largely ineffective in sparing civilian populations from attack. 
Quasi-combatants
With increasingly sophisticated methods of warfare, the civilian population became more involved in the war-making machine, including in supplying arms and ammunitions. 139 One of the great debates during the two world wars revolved around the status of armament and munitions workers. Such persons did not fall within the definitions of 'combatant' or 'non-combatant members of the armed forces' under the Hague Regulations. 140 In the absence of a positive definition of 'civilian', it was also logically problematic to regard them as such, given that their workplaces constituted legitimate military targets under customary international law. 141 The need to clarify the status of such workers, whose contribution to the war effort was arguably on a par with that of soldiers, 142 was compounded by the advent of aerial warfare. Aerial warfare enabled belligerents to attack military objectives -such as munitions factories -on a larger and less discriminate scale than previously. 143 The status of those inside the factories became crucial. Accordingly, as early as 1916 arguments were made that armament workers should be treated as a category of quasi-combatants who lost their immunity as non-combatants and should be treated as combatants while they were engaged in activities harmful to the enemy. In an article in the Revue de Droit International Rolland wrote that armament workers … occupy a position intermediate between the combatants proper and the non-combatants who are still employed on their peacetime trades and professions. The reasons for sparing them are losing force. Fundamentally they are almost in exactly the same position as the men of the auxiliary services of the armies, and the latter are certainly legitimate objects of attack. 144 This argument was taken up with great vigour by some scholars over the next thirty years. 145 In 1938 Spaight famously urged international law to 'move with the times' by accepting that 'the old clear-cut division of enemy individuals into combatants and non-combatants is no longer tenable without some qualification'. 146 This argument was, moreover, extended by some to civilian workers who directly supported the war effort, such as those who transported munitions. 147 The Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations Against New Engines of War, approved in principle by the International Law Association in 1938, 148 reflected Spaight's argument that munitions factory workers should be, while at work, legitimate objects of war. It protected the 'civilian population' from '[forming] the object of an act of war'. 'Civilian population' was defined as 'all those not enlisted in any branch of the combatant services nor for the time being employed or occupied in any belligerent establishment'. 'Belligerent establishments' were defined to include 'military, naval or air establishment, or barracks, arsenal, munition stores or factories, aerodromes or aeroplane workshops or ships of war, naval dockyards, forts, or fortifications for defensive or offensive purposes, or entrenchments'. 149 Thus emerged a precursor to Article 51(3) in the form of the quasi-combatant; that is, a person 'for the time being employed or occupied in a belligerent establishment', such as a munitions store or factory. On its face, it appears that once such people ceased employment within belligerent establishments or, arguably, returned to their homes, they would once again receive the protection offered to the civilian population. The Draft Convention, however, was neither signed nor adopted due to the onset of the Second World War. 150 Accordingly, the question of whether, and to what extent, munitions workers constituted a legitimate target remained a topic of dispute for the duration of the Second World War 151 and, indeed, well beyond.
152
Contribution to the war effort Armament and munitions workers were not the only civilians in danger of attack, particularly from the air, during the two world wars. By the dawn of the Second World War, war had come to be viewed as a totalitarian affair to which all a nation's citizens contributed through industry and morale. 153 While states initially sought to avoid the direct targeting of civilians, as the conflict progressed the perceived demands of military necessity eroded this standard. 154 Consequently, the area and extent of aerial bombardment continually expanded during the Second World War.
155 As Nurick stated, At first, the bombing was confined to military objectives in the actual theater of operations. Then bombing was extended to military objectives, such as factories, communications, and the like in the rear of the enemy's lines, with some regard for the civilian population. Finally, it was extended in many instances to the bombing of cities in order to affect the morale of the civilians. 156 Best aptly observed that plausible economic reasons for injuring civilians had multiplied, and 'their own apparently willing participation in the decisions to make or to continue war seductively suggested that they deserved to be damaged'.
157
The widespread practice of saturation bombing of civilian targets made it difficult to assert that the direct targeting of civilians remained contrary to international law.
158 Scholarly consensus existed, however, on one point: the illegality of targeting the civilian population for the mere purpose of terrorizing the population.
159
The practice of bombing civilians to negate their general contribution to the war effort or to terrorize them into submitting had a significant effect on the development of Protocol I; terror bombing was clearly prohibited by Article 51(2). Further, as will be discussed in the following section of this paper, the requirement in Article 51(3) that participation in hostilities be direct appears to have been formulated largely to ensure that general contribution to the war effort not be sufficient to expose civilians to attack. 160 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949
Enemy attacks by belligerents, whether directly aimed or incidental, were, according to Best, one of the principal causes of civilian suffering in 1939-45. 161 Thus, when the International Committee of the Red Cross 162 took up its longstanding project to improve the protection of civilians following the Second World War, the issue was in dire need of attention. 163 As a result of political circumstances, however, the issue of enemy attacks on civilians was not taken up. 164 Rather, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was tasked only with updating the 'Geneva law' 165 and not the Hague Regulations governing the conduct of military operations. 166 The ICRC observed in its Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention 167 that any provisions in the Convention's draft text designed to protect the civilian population from the dangers of military operations were systematically removed. 168 Accordingly, the Fourth Geneva Convention only protects those who 'find themselves … in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they are not nationals' 169 from arbitrary actions by the enemy. It does not protect civilians against the 'whole series of dangers which threaten them in warfare'. 170 There is, nonetheless, one provision of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which deserves mention in the present context: Common Article 3. This Article sets out minimum guarantees applicable in non-international armed conflict and protects 'persons taking no active part in the hostilities' against 'violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds'. 171 Although one could argue that Common Article 3 sets out the principle of distinction later codified in the Additional Protocols, this was probably not the intention behind the provision, given the Conference's focus on the Geneva law. 172 Common Article 3 is, however, significant for its use of the language 'taking no active part in the hostilities', a precursor to the phrase later adopted in Article 51(3) of Protocol I and Article 13(3) of Protocol II. 174 The 1956 Draft Rules reaffirmed some principles of customary law and offered concrete solutions to resolve problems resulting from changes and developments in weaponry. 175 They were directed primarily towards protecting 'civilian populations efficiently from the dangers of atomic, chemical and bacteriological warfare'. 176 Ultimately the 1956 Draft Rules made no headway with the governments intended to implement them. 177 Nonetheless, they remained an important document in the push for an authoritative revision of the laws of war given the 'ever more distressing varieties of war and war techniques'. 178 The 1956 Draft Rules sought to require parties to 'confine their operations to the destruction of … military resources, and leave the civilian population outside the sphere of armed attacks'.
179 'Civilian population' was negatively (and somewhat awkwardly) defined as all persons who were not (a) Members of the armed forces, or of their auxiliary or complementary organizations; and (b) Persons who do not belong to the forces referred to above, but nevertheless take part in the fighting. 180 Under this definition, individuals who took part in the fighting were not considered civilians, even if their usual activities were primarily peaceful. The range of people protected by civilian immunity under the 1956 Draft Rules was, accordingly, considerably narrower than those later protected under Article 51(3). As discussed later in this paper, one of the reasons for broadening the protection afforded to civilians under Article 51(3) was the increased use of citizens engaged in guerrilla warfare in the years preceding 1977. The ICRC's next, and more subdued, attempt to revise the law of armed conflict was manifested in a draft resolution, which was ultimately adopted by the Twentieth International Red Cross Conference in 1965 in Vienna. 181 The resolution on the 'protection of civilian populations against the dangers of indiscriminate warfare' relevantly provided that distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible. 182 Like the 1956 Draft Rules, the resolution, on its face, provided no protection for civilians who intermittently took part in hostilities. According to Pictet's 1966 analysis of the resolution, the principle it espoused was one of the 'general principles of customary law which now regulate the question'. 183 The resolution was, Pictet observed, 'the only pronouncement of the kind made by an assembly in which governments are represented since the Second World War'. 184 However, no further moves were made to convert the resolution into a binding agreement. 185 It was not until the 1968 Teheran United Nations International Conference on Human Rights 186 that the need to clarify the rules protecting the civilian population gained the necessary traction within the international community. 187 One of the dominant themes at the conference was the law relating to guerrilla warfare. Draft Article 46(2), the predecessor to Article 51(3), provided that '[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Article unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. ' 199 In contrast with the principle as set out in earlier resolutions, draft Article 46(2) made it clear that civilians lost their immunity only for the period during which they took part in hostilities. 200 Once they returned to peaceful activities they would once again be protected by their civilian status. In so providing, draft Article 46(2) shifted the law's balance between military necessity and humanity further towards the latter than previous formulations of the norm. This progression was consistent with the purpose of draft Article 46 as expressed in the provision's heading, 'Protection of the civilian population'. 201 True to the observation by Suter that the law tends to be concerned with the last war, 202 discussions during negotiations seem to have focused on civilians in two historical contexts. On the one hand, a number of states referred to the need to increase the protection afforded to the civilian population in the light of the experience of the Second World War. 203 Other delegations focused attention on the protection of civilians and guerrilla fighters in the context of wars of national liberation. The Chinese representative, for example, argued that People's militia and guerrilla fighters in wars of national liberation should be protected, since they were basically civilians who had been forced to take up arms in self-defence against imperialist repression in order to win independence and safeguard their right to survival. When not participating directly in military operations, members of people's militia or guerrilla movements should have civilian status and benefit from the protection granted to civilians. 204 the proposed amendment as having the same meaning as draft Article 46(2). 213 Similarly, the Australian representative considered the proposal superfluous, 'since a civilian committing a hostile act, even an isolated one, would be taking a direct part in hostilities'. 214 According to Fleck, the GDR representative, the proposed amendment was intended to make draft Article 46 'clear and applicable for the serving soldier'. 215 The proposal was, however, rejected by other states, 216 and ultimately the ICRC draft was preferred.
The view that Article 51(3) encompasses the carrying out of 'hostile acts' nevertheless made its way into the final ICRC commentary on the provision. 217 The commentary unhelpfully conflated the notion of 'direct participation in hostilities' with engaging in 'hostile acts'. 218 Thus, while Protocol I on its face narrowed the exception to the norm of non-combatant immunity, the discussions surrounding Article 51(3) demonstrate that there remained considerable latitude in the interpretation of 'direct participation in hostilities'.
On the whole, the adoption of Protocol I substantially strengthened the protection afforded to civilians in comparison with previous manifestations of the norm of civilian immunity. First, Protocol I adopted a broad definition of 'civilian' which includes all those who do not qualify as a 'combatant'. 219 Second, it provided that only civilians who take a direct part in hostilities lose their protection from attack; indirect participation in hostilities is not sufficient to cause the forfeiture of civilian immunity. 220 Arguments that would see civilian populations lose their immunity due to their 'war sustaining' activities 221 are therefore beyond the legal pale of Article 51(3). 222 Finally, Protocol I expressly recognized that immunity is lost only for such time as civilians participate directly in hostilities.
In the light of these important differences between Article 51(3) and previous formulations of the norm, one might well have doubts about the view expressed by the UK representative during negotiations that Article 51(3) simply reaffirmed existing rules of international law designed to protect civilians. 223 Rather, Protocol I went against the tide of history by expressly conferring civilian status on all those who were not combatants properly so called, regardless of whether or not they were harmless. 231 The inclusive definition of 'civilian' in Article 50 of Protocol I meant that classes of people not fitting the traditional civilian mould were nonetheless entitled to immunity against attack. This definition may be contrasted with the ICRC's 1956 Draft Rules, which, on their face, would have deprived those who took part in the fighting of civilian status altogether. 232 As a result of Protocol I's undifferentiating conception of civilians, international humanitarian law found itself, in the words of Best, 'teetering on the edge of a credibility gap', with the law bestowing on all classes of non-combatants the same protection. 233 Since the adoption of Protocol I in 1977, ways for civilians to harm the enemy have developed and diversified, such that the conduct of a civilian may be as integral to military operations as that of the soldier. 234 We are now far removed from the post-Westphalian paradigm of war as a conflict which takes place on a battlefield between the armed forces of states or state-like entities. 235 As seen in Operation Iraqi Freedom, for instance, military functions are being outsourced to private contractors to an unprecedented degree. 236 Recent years have also seen the rapid development of weapons technology that enables attacks (for example, against computer networks) to be waged with great precision from remote locations by either civilian or military personnel. 237 Advanced weapons technology is, however, far from universally available, and the technological capabilities of the parties to several contemporary international conflicts have been significantly disparate. 238 This military asymmetry appears to have created incentives for the weaker party to resort to more covert or perfidious methods of war which frequently involve civilian participants, such as those seen in the latest conflicts involving international forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. 239 The support of the civilian population becomes, to paraphrase Mao Zedong, as essential to the combatant as water to the fish. 240 Increased reliance on civilian populations by the parties to armed conflicts, together with an often pronounced divergence in their ideological and structural make-up and motivations, 241 blurs conventional understanding about who is and is not a civilian.
